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Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare:
A Portrait of the Jury
SHARI SEIDMAN DIAMONDt
INTRODUCTION
The jury is a magnet for popular and legal scrutiny. The
focus on the jury is not surprising, since we entrust to the
jury some of our most difficult and important decisions. At-
tention, of course, does not mean careful analysis or sys-
tematic study, but it can stimulate vigorous reaction. Wide-
spread interest in the jury has generated a host of images
and beliefs, some of them inconsistent and most of them
based on little or no evidence. It is only in the past forty
years that scholars have been conducting systematic em-
pirical research on the jury. This research provides a basis
for questioning the claims typically made about jury behav-
ior. Here I review some of these claims, outline the various
approaches taken to test their accuracy, and discuss what
we have learned (and not learned) from empirical studies of
the jury.
I. TEN COMMON IMAGES OF THE JURY
1. Juries in Civil Cases Tend to be Pro-plaintiff
The typical civil case tried by a jury is a tort action in
which the plaintiff claims the right to be compensated for
injuries allegedly caused by the defendant. The incidents
that give rise to these jury trials range from the ubiquitous
automobile accident to consumer injuries allegedly arising
from a defective product and patient injuries allegedly
t Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, North-
western University School of Law; Senior Research Fellow, American Bar
Foundation.
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caused by the negligence of physicians and other medical
personnel. Popular culture, encouraged by the insurance
industry,1 views the jury as unreasonably sympathetic to
the injured plaintiff, eager to compensate or over-
compensate both imaginary injuries and misfortunes not
attributable to the actions of the defendant.
2. Juries are Generally Made Up of Uneducated Citizens
Who Can't Figure Out a Way to Get Out of Jury Duty
This image of the jury is often accompanied by the com-
plaint from educated citizens or corporate executives that
they cannot possibly be tried by a "jury of my peers" be-
cause the jury pool fails to draw on middle and upper class
citizens. A contrary image is also prevalent: citizens who
are poor, less educated, or minorities are underrepresented
on the jury. The ideal of a democratic jury, whose common-
sense justice is informed by a diversity of perspectives, con-
flicts with both of these images.
3. The Case Begins and Ends with Jury Selection
In determining whether prospective jurors will serve in
a particular trial, they are questioned by the judge and/or
the attorneys. Litigants, through their attorneys, can ask
the judge to remove jurors who indicate bias in responding
to these questions (challenges for cause) and parties are
also permitted to excuse a limited number of otherwise eli-
gible citizens from the panel without giving reasons for
those decisions (peremptory challenges). The claim is made
that this opportunity to question and to challenge jurors
permits a skilled attorney, sometimes aided by a jury con-
sultant, to produce a jury that will be sure to deliver a fa-
vorable verdict for the attorney's client.
1. For a discussion of industry efforts, see Stephen Daniels, The Question of
Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric,
and Agenda-building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989); see also Marc Gal-
anter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).
2006] BEYOND FANTASY AND NIGHTMARE
4. Citizens Set Aside their Prejudices and Biases When They
Take on their Roles as Jurors
Trial court judges and politicians frequently express
this view of citizens as transformed by the mantle of jury
service. After all, the judge instructs jurors that they should
rely only on the evidence that is presented in the courtroom
and the law as the judge describes it to them in reaching
their verdict. Appellate courts presume that the jury follows
the judge's instructions on the law.
5. The Opening Statements Determine the Verdict Because
Jurors Make Up their Minds by the Time that Opening
Statements are Concluded
Attorneys craft their opening statements to be persua-
sive messages that will frame jurors' understanding and in-
terpretation of the evidence. The claim is made that by
framing the issues, providing meaning and explanations,
and supplying jurors with a story that favors their client, a
skilled attorney can gather support that the evidence and
legal instructions that follow will be unable to dislodge.
6. Jurors Will Uncritically Accept the Claim of a Highly
Credentialed Expert who Presents Complex Testimony
that the Jurors are Unable to Understand
The legal system allows a witness to offer an opinion
rather than confining the testimony being offered to directly
observed events if the witness can demonstrate through ex-
perience and/or training that he or she qualifies as an ex-
pert on a relevant issue. Experts are expected to have
knowledge that will "assist the trier of fact."2 Apparent ex-
pertise is a powerful source of credibility outside the jury-
room, so concern is often expressed that jurors, impressed
and misled by the jargon of an apparently knowledgeable
witness with an extensive resume, will uncritically accept
the expert's claims.
2. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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7. Jurors Generally Ignore the Judge's Instructions on the
Law and Rely on their Own Standards to Reach a
Verdict
Although jurors are instructed on the law they are to
apply, the jury verdict is determined by what the jurors
choose to do during their deliberations. Thus, if their stan-
dards or prejudices conflict with the judge's outline of the
applicable law, the jurors have the power, if not the right,
to reject the legal directives and arrive at a verdict based on
their own standards or lack of standards.
8. The Foreperson is a High Status Juror who Controls the
Jury's Deliberations and Determines the Jury's Verdict
Jurors are generally given little or no guidance in how
to arrive at a verdict once the evidence is in and they have
been instructed on the applicable law. In most states, how-
ever, jurors are told to select a foreperson who will preside
over their deliberations. 3 With no other information or
standards to rely on, it is assumed that jurors will choose or
allow an apparently high status (usually male) member to
seize control of the foreperson's position. The image is that
by strategically manipulating discussions and votes, the
foreperson then controls the course of the jury's delibera-
tions and its ultimate verdict.
9. The Most Talkative Juror Dominates the Jury's
Deliberations and Has the Strongest Influence on the
Jury's Verdict
This portrait of the jury presents a picture of the long-
winded juror who occupies center stage in deliberations,
dominating discussion and thereby inhibiting the flow of
productive exchange among jurors. The overbearing behav-
ior of this juror wears the other members of the jury down
and the verdict reflects not the persuasive arguments of an
effective communicator but merely the views of an active
and persistent talker.
3. In a few states, New York for example, the identity of the foreperson is
not determined by the jury. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 270.15 (McKinney 2006)
(explaining that the juror whose name is drawn first and not excused will be
designated by the court as the foreperson).
720 [Vol. 54
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10. Deliberations are Mere Window-dressing: The Verdict of
the Jury Will be the Position of the Majority of Jurors
Before the Deliberations Begin
The final image on this list is of jurors who know the
verdict they support before they begin to discuss the case
with their fellow jurors. A vote at the beginning of delibera-
tions reveals where the majority stands, and all that re-
mains is to convince those in the minority that either they
are wrong or that they should simply accept the position of
the majority.
A careful reading of this list reveals that many of the
claims made about juries are inconsistent. For example, if
jury selection determines the verdict, then opening state-
ments, evidence, and judicial instructions can have no effect
on the outcome of the trial. Similarly, if the most talkative
juror is the most influential, the foreperson cannot deter-
mine the verdict unless the foreperson always talks the
most. Further, neither the most talkative juror nor the
foreperson can be the most influential if the majority at the
beginning of deliberations determines the verdict unless the
juror who will be the most talkative juror or the foreperson
is always in the majority when deliberations begin.
How, then, might we evaluate the accuracy of these
claims? Social scientists interested in the jury have used a
variety of tools described in Part II of this Essay. Be fore-
warned, however. Although some of the tools are quite pow-
erful, none provides a "truth pellet" enabling the researcher
to produce unequivocal results or findings that are suscep-
tible to only one interpretation. It is fair to say, however,
that the skilled application of a combination of the methods
outlined below has reduced our uncertainties and made
some claims and interpretations more plausible and others
less plausible. Moreover, what we have learned by combin-
ing these various approaches provides a far firmer basis for
drawing inferences about the jury than the anecdotal ap-
proach that frequently grounds public discourse on the jury.
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II. WAYS TO STUDY THE JURY
The jury conducts its work in a partially public setting.
The jury is generally selected in a public courtroom 4 and
watches the trial in the full view of the judge, attorneys,
parties, and spectators who are present in the courtroom.
At the end of the trial, the door closes. The jury retires to
deliberate in the privacy of the juryroom, emerging occa-
sionally to ask a question, but more commonly, only to re-
port its verdict. The court records the verdict and keeps
some records on the trial and the jury. For example, docket
sheets reflect the nature of the case, when the trial began,
and when the jury delivered its verdict. A court reporter
generally takes down everything that occurs in the court-
room, but the court reporter will not produce a transcript of
the proceedings unless someone pays to have it produced
(e.g., in a high stakes case if the parties order a daily tran-
script or if there is an appeal). In contrast, jury delibera-
tions occur outside the presence of any non-juror and courts
do not record the conversation that occurs in the juryroom.
The jury in the United States gives no explanation for its
verdict 5 and the jurors return to their pre-trial lives without
revealing any information about how they arrived at their
decisions. 6
In our efforts to understand jury behavior, researchers
have used a variety of methodological approaches. The pri-
mary methods are: (1) observing jury deliberations, (2) ar-
4. Some judges supplement the public questioning of prospective jurors with
an additional interview in chambers when a juror indicates that a question
opens an area of inquiry that would cause him or her embarrassment to address
in a public courtroom. Some judges routinely question jurors individually in
chambers with only the attorneys present. Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Se-
lection: Spotting UFO Jurors Before They Enter the Jury Room, 36 CT. REV. 10
(1999).
5. The newly re-introduced Spanish jury is required to give a rationale for
its verdict. See Stephan Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The Cases of
Spain and Russia, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 233 (1999). Questions are often
raised about the extent to which the written opinions of judges reveal how they
have arrived at their verdicts. The rationales provided by the Spanish juries
suggest that the group rationale of a lay jury may be even less illuminating.
6. The judge generally tells the jurors in high profile cases that they have no
obligation to speak to members of the press who may contact them and may
even advise the jurors not to speak to the press. Jurors, however, may choose to
answer questions if and when they are approached.
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chival research on jury decisions, (3) post-trial interviews
with jurors, (4) surveys of other trial participants (judges,
attorneys), and (5) experiments with real and simulated ju-
ries. 7 All of them have contributed to our knowledge about
the jury; none provides complete information.
1. Observing Jury Deliberations
An obvious way to study the behavior of any decision-
making body is to watch it as it reaches its decisions. Op-
portunities for courtroom observation are insufficient to re-
veal patterns in jury decision-making. Thus, to learn how a
jury reaches its verdict, a natural approach would be to put
the jury behind a one-way mirror, watch it deliberate, and
record how its behavior varies with the composition of the
jury and the characteristics of the case that the jury is
charged with deciding. The early efforts to study the jury
included a version of this approach. Harry Kalven, Jr. and
Hans Zeisel at the University of Chicago, with support from
the Ford Foundation, mounted the first major study of ju-
ries in the United States.8 As part of their research, they
audiotaped several civil jury deliberations. The effort was
short lived. After one of the tapes was played at a judicial
conference, an uproar ensued that resulted in legislation
that prohibits the recording of federal jury deliberations for
any purpose, including research. 9 Although not all states
have legislation that bars access to jury deliberations, there
have been only a few instances in which deliberations have
been observed or recorded because courts have been reluc-
tant to permit observation even when no law forbids it. Re-
searchers interested in the jury have generally been forced
to study the jury using less direct methods of access. In the
single exception to this pattern, a team of researchers, with
permission from the Pima County Superior Court in Ari-
7. Additional approaches include attempts to model jury behavior based on
various assumptions about, for example, how initial votes are distributed and
how they are likely to be combined, and shadow juries, a rarely used method,
probably due to its high cost, in which a simulated jury sits through an actual
trial. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978).
8. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
9. Id. at vi-vii. For a more detailed account of the reaction, see JAY KATZ,
EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 86 (1972).
723
724 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 54
zona and the cooperation of jurors, attorneys, and litigants,
were allowed to videotape fifty actual civil jury trials and
deliberations in order to examine the effect of recent jury
reforms on jury behavior. 10 All other jury research has used
more indirect methods to study the jury.
2. Archival Research
One method, common to much of the research on jury
behavior, is to examine jury verdict patterns. Thus, re-
searchers have looked at court statistics across jurisdictions
to determine jury conviction rates and to evaluate whether
conviction rates have changed over time." They have also
collected information on case characteristics and jury ver-
dicts in an effort to understand how the two are related.
These archival studies have shown, for example, that award
size increases with the severity of the plaintiffs injury12
and that black defendants who were convicted of killing
white victims were more likely to receive the death penalty
than were black defendants convicted of killing black vic-
10. Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary R. Rose, Leslie Ellis &
Beth Murphy, Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona In-
novation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Juror Discus-
sions]. Other published articles drawing on data from the Arizona Project in-
clude: Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on
Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001); Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil
Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis & Beth Murphy, Inside the Jury Room: Evalu-
ating Juror Discussions During Trial, 87 JUDICATURE 54 (2003) [hereinafter
Diamond et al., Inside the Jury Room]; Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice,
and the Jury, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (2003); Shari Seidman Diamond,
Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Jurors' Unanswered Questions, 41 CT. REV. 20
(2004) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Jurors' Unanswered Questions]; Shari Seid-
man Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revising the Unanimity Re-
quirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
201 (2006) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Revising the Unanimity Requirement];
Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Juror Questions Dur-
ing Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov.
2006) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial].
11. Neil Vidmar, Sara S. Beale, Mary R. Rose & L. R. Donnelly, Should We
Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury? Consider Conviction Rate Data, 80
JUDICATURE 286 (1997).
12. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN
COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll &
Daniel A. Relles, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751
(1985).
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tims. 13 Researchers have also been able to take advantage
of the various local commercial jury verdict reporters that
compile information on individual jury verdicts and case
characteristics to examine, for example, win rates and av-
erage damage levels in various types of cases. 14
All of these studies avoid the weakness of the single
case anecdote or the limited sample of a handful of cases.
They can provide a rich description of patterns in jury ver-
dicts and rates of jury trials. They are limited, however, in
two important ways. First, archival data reflect only the
cases they are able to track and the sources that provide
those data. Most commercial jury verdict reporters depend
on the reports of the litigating attorneys for information on
the cases, so that the reporter may obtain incomplete data
because those sources (1) fail to provide information on
some cases, and (2) do not provide accurate information on
the reported cases. Studies of the jury that are based on
jury verdict reporters reveal a systematic underrepresenta-
tion of cases resulting in findings of no liability and low
damage awards.15
A second weakness of archival studies as a source for
understanding jury behavior is that the attributes of the
case and the jury that they reveal are limited to the attrib-
utes that are recorded. Thus, the archival studies that draw
their data from sources with more comprehensive coverage
of verdicts than the commercially available jury verdict re-
porters (e.g., official reports of courthouse filing or searches
of courthouse records) generally can report on only a limited
number of variables. 16 The trade-off between archival stud-
ies and other data sources is that archival studies of jury
behavior are able to describe a large sample of cases, while
other methods that require original data collection measure
more attributes of a smaller group of cases.
13. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH, & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
(1990).
14. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF
REFORM (1995).
15. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Cri-
sis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999).
16. See John A. Goerdt, Brian J. Ostrom & David B. Rothman, Litigation




3. Post-trial Reports of Jurors
After a trial is concluded, researchers (and journalists)
often attempt to reconstruct what occurred during delibera-
tions. The advantage of this research approach is that the
respondents were present during deliberations and thus in
a position to observe what occurred. The disadvantage is
that they were participants, involved in deciding the case
rather than in carefully tracking the behaviors that oc-
curred in the course of the discussions. Moreover, research-
ers are often interested in questions that even the most at-
tentive observer would need training to assess. For
example, when did the first vote take place? This decep-
tively simple question requires that respondents have paid
attention to the timing of voting or are able to reconstruct
when it occurred from their recollection of the timing of
other events. Moreover, they must understand what the re-
searcher means by a vote. The researcher can easily explain
that a vote may be by secret ballot or verbally or by a show
of hands, but the explanation gets more complicated: is it a
vote if only six of the twelve jurors vote and then someone
raises a question and the jury turns to a discussion of the
evidence, voting only an hour later by a show of hands from
the group as a whole? And what does the vote have to be
about? In an automobile accident case, a jury might have to
decide whether the defendant was negligent, whether the
negligence caused the plaintiffs injury, and the extent of
the injury caused by the defendant's negligence. Does a vote
on whether the defendant was negligent constitute a vote?
What if the foreperson says, "Are we all agreed that the de-
fendant was speeding?" and several jurors nod, and the
group then moves on to discuss whether the defendant's
negligence caused injury to the plaintiff? Has a vote oc-
curred? In a criminal case involving alternative verdicts
(first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter,
acquittal), does agreement that the defendant did not have
the mental state required for first degree murder constitute
a vote? These complexities and potential ambiguities illus-
trate why it should be no surprise that researchers find
substantial disagreement on post-trial interviews and ques-
[Vol. 54726
2006] BEYOND FANTASY AND NIGHTMARE
tionnaires about what occurred in jury deliberations from
jurors who served on the same jury.17
Two further obstacles arise when researchers depend
on post-trial juror reports. First, it is rarely possible to in-
terview jurors immediately when the trial ends, so that
memory decay may impair juror recollection. Second, and
more importantly, jurors are limited in their perspective on
deliberations by being participants in the process. They are
answering questions and providing information through the
filter of their own understanding of what occurred. Post-
trial interviews and surveys can control for many of these
potential weaknesses. If researchers interview multiple ju-
rors from the same case, they can compare the reactions
across jurors. Thus, if a substantial majority of the jurors
on the same case recall that the jury discussed the judge's
instructions on reasonable doubt, that report is more likely
to be accurate than if a single juror recalls that the instruc-
tions were discussed. Some juror responses, however, even
those from a majority of the jurors, may systematically dis-
tort actual events. For example, if jurors are admonished by
the judge that they are not to consider insurance, post-trial
interviews may fail to reveal that the jurors adjusted their
award because they concluded that the defendant was in-
sured; the jurors may be unwilling to disclose this violation
of the judge's instructions. In addition to motivations that
distort juror responses are cognitive effects that may alter
the perceptions of the most cooperative interviewee or sur-
vey respondent. Jurors are being questioned about the
process that produced the verdict they ultimately voted for
and they know how the trial came out. The outcome can
have a powerful impact on jurors, leading them in retro-
spect to view the verdict ultimately arrived at as inevitable
and thereby affecting their recall of the process that pro-
duced it.'8
17. See, e.g., Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Prede-
liberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 175 (1995).
18. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowl-
edge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
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4. Surveys of Other Trial Participants (Judges, Attorneys)
When researchers question judges and attorneys about
the jury trials they have participated in, these knowledge-
able respondents can provide an informed perspective on
the characteristics of the trial and the behavior of the jury.
As with any other informants, the perspective of these ob-
servers influences what they report about the trial and the
jury. For example, the defense attorney characterizes the
defendant in a trial as the crucial witness while the prose-
cutor identified another witness as more important. If the
responses from both attorneys can be compared, at least the
range of opinion can be assessed, even if there is no direct
evidence from either response on which witnesses actually
influenced the jury more (note that the verdict cannot an-
swer the question, since witnesses can influence the jury ei-
ther positively or negatively). If the two attorneys agree,
that agreement offers substantially better grounded evi-
dence than either alone would provide.
Some of the influences on informants are less obvious
and more difficult to control for. For example, in their clas-
sic study of the jury, Kalven and Zeisel surveyed trial
judges, asking them for each jury trial they presided over to
report on the characteristics of case, the jury's verdict in the
case, how the judge would have decided the case, and, if the
judge disagreed with the jury's verdict, why they thought
the jury arrived at a different verdict. 19 If judges generally
filled out the questionnaire after they knew the jury's ver-
dict, it is likely that they were somewhat influenced by the
jury's verdict not only in their assessment of how they
would have decided the case, but also in their reports about
characteristics of the case, such as the attractiveness of the
defendant. The size of that influence is impossible to gauge.
A few researchers have attempted to overcome these limita-
tions or at least to measure their effects by obtaining the
responses of multiple informants or to measure the ways in
which post-verdict and pre-verdict responses from judges
differ. 20
19. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8.
20. See JOHN BALDWIN & MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS (1979); Diamond et al.,
Juror Discussions, supra note 10, at 1; Paula L. Hannaford et al., Permitting
Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 359 (2000).
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5. Experiments with Juries
Many questions about juries are causal questions (e.g.,
how does a unanimity versus a majority decision rule affect
jury verdicts?) and questions about jury decision-making
processes (e.g., how do juries go about resolving their differ-
ences?). Some of these questions have been posed in the
context of proposed jury reforms. For example, what are the
effects of permitting jurors to ask questions or to discuss
the evidence before the end of the trial? Experiments,
whether field or simulated, provide the strongest evidence
on causal inference. In a successful experiment, the only
difference between groups receiving the experimental
treatment (e.g., permitting jurors to ask questions) and
those not receiving it is the experimental treatment itself.
Thus, any difference in outcomes can be directly attributed
to the experimental treatment.
In a field experiment, actual trials are assigned to vary-
ing conditions (e.g., jurors in some trials are permitted to
ask questions, jurors in other trials are not permitted to ask
questions). When these experiments involve jury trials,
they require substantial cooperation from the courts and
close monitoring to ensure that random assignment to ex-
perimental conditions is being successfully implemented.
Not surprisingly, therefore, field experiments on jury trials
are relatively rare and the measures collected to assess ef-
fects are generally limited.
In simulation experiments, by far the most widely used
method of studying the jury, jurors or juries are also ran-
domly assigned to experimental conditions, but the trials
are simulated (although they may be drawn from real tri-
als). Simulation experiments combine control with the op-
portunity to examine the process of decision-making. Simu-
lations vary in the degree to which they approximate the
conditions of a real trial. In the closest approximations they
include videotaped trials that include witnesses, arguments
and instructions, jurors who participate during their jury
service, and deliberations. The extent to which behaviors
observed in the less elaborate simulations, or indeed in the
more elaborate simulations, mirror the behavior of real ju-
729
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ries is unknown, 21 although much evidence suggests sub-
stantial correspondence between results from simulations
and from other research approaches. 22
III. WHAT WE'VE LEARNED, How WE'VE LEARNED IT, AND
OBSTACLES ALONG THE WAY
All of the ten jury images described in Part I have been
the subject of empirical research using at least one of the
approaches described in Part II. Researchers have been se-
lective in their research strategies, in part because not all of
these beliefs about the jury are susceptible to investigation
by all methodological approaches. For example, archival re-
search is only possible when someone has decided that a
particular measure was worth recording and is only useful
if those assigned to record the information have done so
diligently. Thus, researchers cannot use archival data to
study the distribution of final votes on the jury in jurisdic-
tions that do not require unanimous verdicts unless the
courts have recorded them. In considering the available
evidence pertaining to each of the ten jury images, I will
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence in
light of the methodological approach chosen by the re-
searchers who have examined them.
1. Pro-plaintiff Juries?
Although the popular press recently has portrayed ju-
rors as indiscriminately pro-plaintiff, archival research pro-
duces a different picture. In tort cases decided by juries, es-
timates based on cases sampled from court files in the
seventy five most populous counties suggest that plaintiffs
prevail on average in 51% of cases, a percentage that varies
from 26% in medical malpractice cases to 69% in cases of
animal attacks. 23 Moreover, the plaintiffs' success rate is
21. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from
Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997) (an extended discussion of
the conditions that encourage and discourage parallel behavior).
22. See Brian H. Bomstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is
the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999).
23. Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,
tbl.3, Nov. 2004, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ttvlc0l.pdf. This roughly
fifty percent win rate replicates the rate obtained in the 1990s. See also Brian J.
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artificially inflated because liability is either uncontested or
only partially contested in some percentage of the cases
counted as plaintiff victories. 24
One can, of course, construct an explanation for this
pattern that is consistent with the pro-plaintiff jury: antici-
pating that the jury will be pro-plaintiff, defendants settle
the cases they are likely to lose, taking their chance with a
jury only when the evidence strongly favors them. Nonethe-
less, as a descriptive statement of what juries do with the
cases that they are asked to decide, it is inaccurate to say
that juries generally find for the plaintiff. In addition, when
we examine the behavior of simulated juries, review post-
trial interviews with real jurors, or watch real juries delib-
erating, we find jurors who are highly suspicious of plain-
tiffs and unsympathetic when they encounter complaints
from individuals they suspect may be whining or greedy. 25
Moreover, the few studies that have compared the liability
verdicts of judges with those of jurors have shown no ten-
dency for jurors to be more inclined to find for the plaintiff
than are judges.26
Even if juries are not pro-plaintiff when it comes to li-
ability, are they over-generous in awarding damages? Here
the picture is more mixed, when we compare jurors and
judges and when we interpret the meaning of the results.
Some researchers have found no difference, 27 while others
have found that jurors tend to make somewhat higher
awards. For example, Kalven and Zeisel found that judges
agreed with the jury on liability 78% of the time, and
among cases in which they disagreed, the jury found for the
plaintiff half the time. 28 When the judge and jury agreed on
Ostrom, David B. Rottman & John A. Goerdt, A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile
of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 235 (1996).
24. Diamond et al., Juror Discussions, supra note 10, at 19 n.45.
25. Id. at 13; see also VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
26. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1124 (1992); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field In-
vestigation of its Meaning and Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994).
27. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage
Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Profession-
als, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 901 (1993).
28. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 63-64.
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liability, however, juries on average awarded 20% more
than the judges reported that they would have awarded.
Similarly, in a recent large scale survey of jury-eligible citi-
zens, attorneys, and judges involving case summaries, Ro-
selle Wissler and her colleagues found that the jury-eligible
respondents in Illinois on average gave higher awards for
pain and suffering than did the judges, while in New York,
the award levels did not differ. 29 In both Illinois and New
York, the jurors' average awards were between those of the
plaintiffs' attorneys and those of the defense attorneys. 30 In
both jurisdictions, injuries that were given larger awards by
one group also tended to receive larger awards from the
other groups. 31 What explains these differences and simi-
larities? Studies of the decision-making processes of both
jurors and judges suggest that they rely on similar injury
attributes and use them in similar ways in reaching judg-
ments about injury severity.32 Jurors in the Wissler study,
however, did see the injuries as somewhat more severe than
did other respondents. 33 The final quagmire is that the ap-
propriate level for a pain and suffering award is ambigu-
ous. 34 If jurors give awards that are less than the plaintiffs
attorney thinks are adequate and more than the defense at-
torney thinks are appropriate, and the jury bases its award
on a defensible combination of relevant criteria, is it accu-
29. Rosselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking
About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98
MICH. L. REV. 751, 774 (1999).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Edmond S. Howe & Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and
Outcome Information by Students and Circuit Judges: Design Economy and In-
dividual Differences, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 102 (1992); Jennifer K. Rob-
bennolt, Punitive Damage Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and Trial
Court Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315 (2002).
33. Wissler et al., supra note 29, at 774-75.
34. A similar question arises for punitive damages, which occur in 3% of
jury trials. Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts
in Large Counties, 2001, tbl.2, Apr. 2004, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/
ctcvlc01.htm (3% obtained by multiplying the overall win rate of .526 by the
percentage of cases with punitive damages when plaintiff wins (.057) in Table
2). Punitive damage awards attract a disproportionate attention in the debate
about allegedly pro-plaintiff jury behavior due to a small number of unusually
high awards. Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, ANNUAL
REV. LAw & Soc. ScI. 255, 264 (2005).
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rate to characterize the jury's behavior as pro-plaintiff even
if judges would award somewhat less? Or are the judges
merely conservative or pro-defendant?
2. How Representative is the Jury?
Jury composition has changed dramatically over time.
The early English jury was composed of male property own-
ers summoned to decide a case because they were familiar
with the facts. 35 The modern American jury is the product
of a multi-stage selection process that typically begins with
a list of potentially eligible jurors drawn from voter regis-
tration lists and often supplemented by individuals holding
drivers' licenses in the general geographic area where the
court sits. If the list has not been recently updated, it be-
comes less representative of the population from which it is
drawn. For example, according to one estimate, a master
list of voters updated every four years would exclude two-
thirds of the potential jurors under thirty.36 Disproportion-
ate losses also occur for minorities due to higher geographic
mobility. 37
Once the master list is compiled, the court mails quali-
fication questionnaires to the addresses of individuals ran-
domly selected from the list. A substantial number (over
20% in Dallas, 38 an average of 12% according to a national
survey of state court administrators39) of questionnaires are
returned by the post office as undeliverable and others are
simply not returned. Individuals returning the question-
naires may fail to qualify for jury service if they are not citi-
35. See THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE (1985); JON
M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977).
36. 1986 California Jury Survey, University of California, Riverside, dis-
cussed in Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfran-
chisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L. BLACK L.J. 238, 248-
49 (1994).
37. See id. at 247-48; see also, HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER &
RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1993).
38. Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury
Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2001).
39. Robert G. Boatright, Why Citizens Don't Respond To Jury Summonses,
and What Courts Can Do About It, 82 JUDICATURE 156, 157 (1999).
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zens or if they indicate that they cannot read or write Eng-
lish. Others may be excused from service if they are infirm,
or if they are the primary caretaker for a sick or elderly in-
dividual or for young children. Until recently, most states
excluded from jury service individuals in particular occupa-
tions (e.g., physicians, lawyers, clergy). 40 Currently, over
two-thirds of states have fewer occupational exemptions
and half have no automatic exemptions. 41 Where juror pay
is low (e.g., $6 per day in Dallas until recently) and a pro-
spective juror works on commission or for low wages with
an employer who will not pay the juror during jury duty,
judges are more willing to grant an excuse for economic
hardship. In some jurisdictions, the jury summons is part of
the juror qualification questionnaire. In most, however, the
court sends a jury summons to prospective jurors after it
has determined, based on the qualification questionnaire,
that they are qualified to serve. An estimated 20% of those
who receive a jury summons do not respond to it, although
a failure to respond constitutes a violation of the law. A few
courts have begun to prosecute jurors for a failure to re-
spond (e.g., New York), but most courts simply summon
enough jurors to obtain a yield that will fill their needs. 42
The loss of prospective jurors at each stage of the quali-
fication and summons process is not random. A comparison
of the demographic characteristics of the adult citizenry of a
geographic area with the jury pool in the court that draws
from that area reveals a systematic underrepresentation of
40. Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Im-
pairment of the "Fair Cross-Section of the Community," 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155,
165-66 (1995).
41. Id; see also Anne Skove, Jury Management: Exemptions from Jury Duty,
May 2, 2006, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Memos/JurManExemptions
Memo.htm. For example, as of July 2006, Indiana eliminated all automatic ex-
emptions. Previously, licensed dentists and veterinarians were excused, as well
as members in active service of the armed forces, elected or appointed govern-
mental officials, honorary military staff officers appointed by the governor or in
the guard reserve forces authorized by the governor, members of the board of
school commissioners of the city of Indianapolis and members of police or fire
departments. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-28-4-8 (West 2006).
42. Nancy J. King, Jury Delinquency in Criminal Trials in American, 1796-
1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2701 (1996).
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minorities, younger individuals, and those at lower income
levels. 43
The composition of the jury pool does not represent the
final stage in jury selection. That stage occurs when the
prospective jurors from the jury pool are brought into the
courtroom and questioned to determine whether they will
serve in the particular case. Those who express clear pre-
conceived notions about what the verdict in the case should
be or have a connection with the parties that indicates a
conflict of interest are excused by the judge (the challenge
for cause). In addition, the parties can excuse a limited
number of prospective jurors (the peremptory challenge).
Although peremptory challenges do not require any justifi-
cation, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that challenges
based on race or sex violate the Constitution and are thus
prohibited. 44 The actual composition of juries compared
with the composition of the jury pool has received little at-
tention, but the limited data available suggest that the dis-
tribution of jurors who end up serving on trials does not dif-
fer substantially from the distribution of those who appear
at the courthouse on race, gender, occupation, and educa-
tional background. In an analysis of over a thousand quali-
fied members of the jury pool in Cook County, Diamond and
Casper found that 18.1% of jurors reported that they had
previously served on a jury.45 Men and women were equally
likely to report they had served on a jury, and the rate did
not differ between white non-Hispanic jurors and minority
jurors. 46 Similarly, jurors with professional or managerial
occupations were as likely to report that they had previ-
ously served on a jury as were jurors with other occupa-
tions. Reports of prior service on a jury increased with juror
43. See FUKURAI, BUTLER & KROOTH, supra note 37; Hillel Y. Levin & John
W. Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection Process?,
38 CONN. L. REV. 325 (2006).
44. For a review of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny,
see Shari Seidman Diamond, Leslie Ellis, & Elizabeth Schmidt, Realistic Re-
sponses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
77, 79-80 (1997).
45. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Understanding Juries
(2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
46. These rates compared whether a juror had served on a jury at least once
and not how often, so they may not reflect differences between groups in the
probability of being selected for a single trial.
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age, reflecting the longer period of jury eligibility for the
older jurors. Retired jurors were more likely than other ju-
rors to report that they had previously served on a jury, but
that rate was consistent with the elevated rate of prior ser-
vice among older jurors generally. The only other back-
ground characteristic on which jurors and non-jurors dif-
fered significantly was education, but the least and most
well-educated were similar in their record of prior service.
Jurors with a college degree but not graduate training were
somewhat less likely to report that they had served (11.0%),
in contrast with those who had no more than a high school
diploma (22.4%), some college (18.9%) or graduate training
(19.3%).
Although these results suggest that, at least in the ag-
gregate, jury selection in the courthouse does not affect dis-
tribution on the jury, the aggregate picture may be some-
what misleading. Rose found that although the racial
distributions on juries generally matched the distributions
in the venires from which they were selected, African
Americans were significantly more likely to be excused by
the prosecution and Whites were more likely to be excused
by the defense.47
The result of this variety of shaping and sometimes
cross-cutting forces is that juries tend to be somewhat more
educated, wealthier and older, and less likely to include a
representative number of minorities than the distribution
of these groups in the adult population. The selection proc-
ess that occurs before the jurors enter the courtroom is pri-
marily responsible for the extent to which juries fail to be
representative of the communities from which the jurors
are drawn. Changes that would increase representativeness
include use of up-to-date address lists that would reduce
the impact of the greater mobility of lower income citizens,
better follow-up on non-response to the court's juror qualifi-
cation questionnaires and summonses, increases in finan-
cial compensation for jurors, greater use of and publicity for
one day/one trial, and increased enforcement of Batson pro-
hibitions on exclusions based on race.
47. Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Dis-
crimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999).
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3. The Impact of Jury Selection on Trial Outcomes
If the evidence in a case is not totally one-sided, people
may have some difference of opinion in their evaluation of
the evidence and in their views about what the appropriate
verdict should be. Predictions of different potential out-
comes drive the choice of trial rather than a settlement or
guilty plea or dismissal of charges. Post-trial interviews
with jurors suggest that disagreement among jurors on the
first ballot is the rule rather than the exception.
Since jurors reacting to the same trial have been ex-
posed to precisely the same evidence and instructions,
variation in juror responses is the only possible explanation
for that initial disagreement. Note that differences among
jurors do not necessarily translate into differences among
juries. If a majority of the total population of potential ju-
rors would individually prefer a particular verdict, a sample
of jurors randomly selected to judge the case would be likely
to include a majority of individuals who would prefer that
verdict. 48 If the majority on the jury generally persuades
the minority, then all juries hearing that case would be
likely to reach the same verdict.
Juries, of course, are not randomly selected from the
population of possible jurors and if there is variation in
their verdict preferences, the composition of a particular
jury can influence the outcome of the trial. The question is
to what extent attorneys (alone or aided by consultants) can
predict those variations based on juror characteristics that
can be assessed during jury selection. 49 Attempts to predict
juror verdict preferences from background characteristics
have generally been able to explain only a modest amount
of variance in outcomes. Demographic characteristics like
gender, race, and age generally account for very little of the
variation in response. Attitudinal characteristics can be
more powerful, albeit also modest, predictors. For example,
Diamond and her colleagues found that the single attitudi-
48. Within the limits of sampling error. As with any sample, a jury of six
would be less likely than a jury of twelve to have a majority that reflects the
majority position in the population. Thus, the trend toward smaller juries may
have increased the role played by variability in juror reactions.
49. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Sci-
entists Know and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178 (1990).
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nal question, "when plaintiffs sue in a lawsuit and receive
money damages, would you say that in general they receive
(on a scale from 1 to 7) 1 = too much through 7 = too little?,"
was a better predictor of liability verdicts for simulated ju-
rors deciding a products liability case than the combination
of ten background characteristics. 50 What, then, accounts
for variation among jurors in response to the same case?
One possibility is that there are powerful, but as of yet un-
measured, individual differences that could be identified in
advance and used to inform choices during jury selection. At
least as likely, the differences result from variations in re-
sponse to the evidence stimulated by a variety of unpredict-
able reasons. Thus, the juror (or judge) evaluating a witness
who bears a resemblance to a friend (or enemy) may be
more (or less) likely to believe that witness. The advantage
of the jury as opposed to a single trier of fact is that any one
of these various unknowable predispositional factors is
unlikely to affect all of the jurors or affect them in the same
way.
Simulation studies of the jury in which the investiga-
tors have examined individual differences across jurors
have tended to examine reactions to a single ambiguous
case in order to obtain a distribution of verdict preferences
and outcomes. This approach has a weakness in producing
a picture of disagreement rather than agreement. Studies
examining the effect of the evidence on jury decisions across
cases generally find that variations in the evidence strongly
affect jury decisions. In a classic field study, Christy Visher
illustrated the crucial role played by evidence as compared
with juror characteristics.5 1 She found that characteristics
of the evidence (e.g., whether there was testimony about the
use of a weapon) in a sample of sexual assault cases ac-
50. Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. Saks & Stephan Landsman, Juror
Judgments about Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to
Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 306-13 (1998) (The single attitu-
dinal item accounted for 6.9% of the variance in verdicts (9.2% using the less
conservative Nagelkerke value); the ten background characteristics together
accounted for 5.4% of the variance (Nagelkerke value = 7.2%)); see also Steven
D. Penrod, Predictors of Jury Decision Making in Criminal and Civil Cases: A
Field Experiment, 3 FORENSIC REP. 261 (1990). See generally REID HASTIE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
51. Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence,
11 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987).
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counted for 34% of the variance in verdict preferences. 52 Vic-
tim, defendant, and juror characteristics together accounted
for only an additional 10%. 53 Thus, variations in evidence
were more influential than the make-up of the juries. Simi-
larly, Stephen Garvey and his colleagues analyzed the re-
ported first-votes and jury verdicts of three thousand jurors
in four major metropolitan areas.54 Strength of the evidence
as measured by the judge's rating was consistently a strong
predictor of jurors' first votes, while juror demographic
characteristics (age, gender, race, and ethnicity) had incon-
sistent and limited effects, with one exception: African-
American jurors sitting on drug cases involving minority
defendants in Washington, D.C. were more likely than
white jurors in those cases to cast their first vote for acquit-
tal.55 Both the generally low predictability of verdicts based
on juror attributes and the consistently prominent predictor
role of the evidence are of course inconsistent with the
claim that jury selection predictably determines the out-
come of a trial.
4. Setting Aside Prejudices and Biases
We have seen that jurors often vary in their individual
verdict preferences. One potential source of these variations
is prejudices and biases that may substitute for an evalua-
tion of the strength of the evidence in light of the instruc-
tions on the law. Two ambiguities emerge from the contrast
between prejudices and biases on the one hand, and evi-
dence and instructions on the other. First, while some bi-
ases clearly represent inappropriate prejudices (e.g., racial
bias), the characterization of other potential prejudices and
biases is unclear-that is, where should the line be drawn
between ordinary differences in expectations and reactions
based on experience, and unacceptable prejudice or bias
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 12.
54. See Stephen P. Garvey, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole
L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman & Martin T. Wells, Juror First Votes in
Criminal Trials: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 371 (2004).
55. These are precisely the cases that Paul Butler has argued are appropri-
ate for race-based juror nullification. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullifi-
cation, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
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that leads to misusing or ignoring evidence? Second, if indi-
vidual differences affect reactions to evidence, jurors are us-
ing the evidence to arrive at their decisions when they in-
terpret the evidence in light of their expectations and
beliefs about the world.
Suppose that a juror believes that many people bring
unjustified claims to court in order to collect money that he
or she is not really entitled to receive. The juror carefully
scrutinizes the testimony of the plaintiff and is easily con-
vinced that the plaintiff is exaggerating the pain she suf-
fered in an automobile accident. Another juror whose
brother has been suffering from a soft tissue injury that has
left him with severe pain is more inclined to believe the
plaintiffs testimony. Is either juror allowing prejudice or
bias to affect their judgment, or are they merely reflecting
beliefs and values-that is, the personal experiences and
common sense knowledge about the world-that jury in-
structions tell them to apply in their role as jurors?
Now assume instead that the witness is a police officer
and the juror is more or less inclined to believe the testi-
mony based on beliefs about the police or personal observa-
tions of police behavior in the past. Prejudice? Bias? Rele-
vant experience and commonsense? Beliefs about the world
and preconceived notions about the likely credibility of par-
ticular witnesses affect juror reactions to the evidence at
trial-indeed one rationale for the jury is that the institu-
tion invites multiple citizens with diverse backgrounds to
pool their experiences and perceptions.
There is little doubt that expectations, beliefs, and val-
ues affect the way that jurors react to evidence. 56 In that
respect, jurors are no different from any other decision-
makers, because people ordinarily scrutinize more carefully
and are more likely to reject information that is inconsis-
tent with their beliefs and expectations, 57 because it is gen-
erally easier for people to remember theory-consistent in-
56. Vicki L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The
Influence of People's Prior Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 517 (1996).
57. See Anne Locksely, Charles Stangor, Christine Hepburn, Ellen
Grosovsky & Mariann Hochstrasser, The Ambiguity of Recognition Memory
Tests of Schema Theories, 16 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 421 (1984).
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formation than theory-inconsistent information,5 8 and be-
cause ambiguous information tends to be interpreted as
theory-consistent. 59
Based on their survey of judges in criminal jury trials,
Kalven and Zeisel suggested that values were implicated
two-thirds of the time in the 22% of cases in which the
judge and jury disagreed on the verdict.60 The most fre-
quently occurring values were an expanded version of the
law of self-defense, contributory fault of the victim, and a
sense that the offending conduct was de minimis. In gen-
eral, the disagreement appeared to arise from a combina-
tion of values and the interpretation of the evidence.
Some types of cases are more likely than others to im-
plicate strongly held beliefs or values. Diamond and Casper
found in their antitrust case that few jurors brought strong
views or expectations to the price-fixing conflict between
two businesses. 61 In contrast, jurors on their death penalty
case expressed positions on the death penalty and views
about the appropriate punishment for the typical murderer
that were strong predictors of their views of the evidence
and their verdict preferences. This strong relationship be-
tween predisposing death penalty values (i.e., how strongly
the juror supports the death penalty and whether the juror
believes that a person who commits the typical murder
should receive the death penalty) and predeliberation ver-
dict preferences occurred even though jurors were removed
from the sample if they would not have been qualified to
serve in a capital case because of their extreme views on the
death penalty.6 2 Although death penalty cases probably rep-
58. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Con-
sidered Evidence, 37 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
59. See R.P. Vallone, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, The Hostile Media Phe-
nomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the
Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577 (1985).
60. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at tbl.30.
61. Diamond & Casper, supra note 45.
62. Id. Jurors were removed if they said they were opposed to the death
penalty, if they said that their reservation about the death penalty would sub-
stantially interfere with their voting for a death sentence no matter what the
facts of the case were, or they would always vote for the death penalty if the de-
fendant was found guilty of a murder for which the law allowed the jury to im-
pose a death sentence.
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resent the extreme end of the continuum of cases in which
values are implicated, they provide a sobering example of
the human elements of legal decision-making. We do not
have a comparable study of judicial death penalty deci-
sions, but it may not be overreaching to point to disagree-
ments on the United States Supreme Court in the applica-
tion of legal rules in death penalty cases as some evidence
that values affect justices' as well as jurors' decisions. 63
5. Opening Statements
Both lawyer lore and social science theory anticipate an
influential role for opening statements. 64 Although some
scholars have taken issue with this claim 65 and judges regu-
larly admonish jurors to avoid becoming committed to a po-
sition before hearing all of the evidence and the judicial in-
structions, a long history of research reveals the crucial role
played by first impressions in organizing and influencing
later information-processing and judgments.66 The well-
documented primacy effect suggests that information pre-
sented early may be particularly important. 67 Opening
statements can create thematic frameworks, or schemata,
that guide jurors during the trial and deliberations in their
observation, organization, and retrieval of evidence. 68 More-
63. A prominent place for values in judicial decision making is reflected in
the Attitudinal Model. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
64. See E. Allan Lind & Gina Y. Ke, The Relative Importance of Opening and
Closing Statements, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 229
(Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985).
65. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); see also Hans Zeisel, A
Jury Hoax: The Superpower of the Opening Statement, 14 A.B.A. J. LITIG. 17
(1988).
66. See Solomon E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258 (1946); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr.,
Hypothesis Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1202 (1978).
67. See Daniel Linz & Steven Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in
the Courtroom, 8 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing primacy in the con-
text of opening statements).
68. See John H. Lingle & Thomas M. Ostrom, Principles of Memory and
Cognition in Attitude Formation, in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN PERSUASION 399
(Richard E. Petty, Thomas M. Ostrom & Timothy C. Brock eds., 1981); Thomas
J. Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg, David Mack & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Open-
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over, opening statements inconsistent with the evidence
may influence verdicts by causing jurors to recall the evi-
dence inaccurately. Pyszczynski and his colleagues con-
ducted a simulation study in which the defense attorney ei-
ther promised or did not promise an alibi witness who never
appeared.6 9 The promise, even though unfulfilled, reduced
guilt preferences. 70
On the other hand, both theory and evidence suggest
limitations on the persuasive power of opening statements.
In an interview study of jurors who had sat in civil trials,
Hans and Sweigart found that 63% said they remained neu-
tral after the opening statements. 71 Moreover, in ten of the
fourteen cases on which they sat, a majority of jurors inter-
viewed said they had not been drawn to either side after
openings statements. 72 The jurors attributed the fact that
they were not drawn to one side or another to several fac-
tors: judicial instructions to attempt to remain neutral until
all the evidence had been presented; the jurors' own sense
that they had not heard the evidence at the time opening
arguments were completed; their desire to resist the im-
pulse to be swayed by their emotions; and the fact that they
were in fact undecided at that point in the trial.73 Although
we might be skeptical of these socially desirable self-report
data, they are consistent with results obtained using other
methodological approaches. For example, Hughes and Hsi-
ao report tracking data from simulated trials in which re-
spondents' positions were assessed at various points in the
trial. 74 Their findings suggest substantial change in juror
verdict preferences during the course of evidence presenta-
ing Statements in a Jury Trial: The Effect of Promising More Than the Evidence
Can Show, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (1981). See generally Nancy Pen-
nington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
69. Pyszczynski et al., supra note 68, at 437.
70. Id. at 440, 442. Guilt preferences were measured on a scale that com-
bined the dichotomous verdict choice (guilty/not-guilty) with a confidence rat-
ing.
71. Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors' Views of Civil Lawyers: Im-
plications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L.J. 1297, 1310 (1993).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1310-11.
74. G. David Hughes & Henry S. Hsiao, Does the Opening Determine the
Verdict? Not in Most Cases, It Appears, 22 TRIAL 66 (1986).
743
744 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 54
tion. In three of the four cases they studied, jurors were
more likely to change their verdict preferences as evidence
was presented than they were to retain their post-opening
statement verdict.7 5
There are also theoretical reasons for caution about as-
sertions that the opening statement is a pivotal event in ju-
ror decision-making. For example, framing effects may be
tempered in an adversary setting. A clear intent to per-
suade tends to reduce the influence of a communicator on a
highly involved audience, 76 and in the adversary system ju-
rors are well-aware of counsel's intent to persuade. Thus, in
the study of the effects of promises made in opening state-
ments discussed above, 77 the advantage gained by the de-
fense by promising a defense alibi witness disappeared
when the prosecutor drew attention to the unfulfilled prom-
ise. In general, one might expect the influence of claims
substantially inconsistent with the evidence to be tempered
in a real trial where opposing counsel will be eager to point
them out.
Tracking studies, in which juror reactions are assessed
at multiple points in the course of a simulated trial, provide
the most direct evidence on the impact of opening state-
ments. If the opening statement is as powerful as some
claim, we would not expect to see verdict preferences chang-
ing after the opening statements are completed. Of course,
jurors may not change after the opening statements simply
because they accurately preview what the evidence will
show, so that a change measure in a tracking study proba-
bly provides a conservative measure of change. Diamond
and her colleagues measured juror verdict preferences in a
death penalty hearing after the prosecutor's opening, the
defense attorney's opening, the prosecutor's case, the defen-
dant's case, the closings, and after judicial instructions.7 8
They computed the percentage of jurors who consistently
75. Id. at 67 tbl.1.
76. See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Effects of Forwarning of Per-
suasive Intent and Involvement on Cognitive Responses and Persuasion, 5 PERS.
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 173 (1979).
77. See Pyszczynski et al., supra note 68, at 442.
78. Shari Seidman Diamond, Jonathan D. Casper, Cami L. Heiert & Anna-
Maria Marshall, Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996).
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maintained the same verdict they rendered after opening
arguments. Approximately two-thirds of the jurors reached
a verdict after the prosecutor's opening which remained
constant for the rest of the trial.79 An additional 4%
changed following the defense opening and thereafter re-
mained constant.80 The remaining 30% of the jurors
changed their verdict as a result of new information pro-
vided after the opening statements.8 1  Of those who
changed, 18% ended up giving a different verdict than they
had favored at the end of opening statements; 12% returned
to the verdict they had favored after opening statements.8 2
The 30% rate of change in this study represents a con-
servative estimate of the potential influence of the evidence.
First, our initial measure of juror verdict preferences fol-
lowed the prosecutor's very complete foreshadowing of his
evidence. If his opening statement had been less accurate or
less complete, the effect of the evidence might have been
greater. In addition, because the tracking study did not in-
clude deliberations, the 30% does not include any changes
in position brought about by discussing the evidence during
deliberations. The rate of change measure is incomplete in
another way as well. Jurors in the course of the trial
changed not only their verdicts but also their confidence in
their verdicts. Thus, "94% of the jurors changed their ver-
dict and/or their confidence ratings in the course of the
trial, suggesting they were open and responsive to the evi-
dence, whether or not it was enough to make them change
their vote. 83
Finally, the rate of change in verdict only partially re-
veals the overall consequence of the verdict change in shift-
ing the overall distribution of juror preferences. Although
39% of the jurors were prepared to vote for death following
79. Id. at 30. The prosecutor presented an accurate and quite complete pic-
ture of the evidence his witnesses would later provide.
80. Id.
81. Id. Although most verdict instability is probably due to evidence and ar-
gument, some portion of it may also be the result of measurement error.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 31. It is hard to know whether this level of fluctuation would occur
in other kinds of cases. One might argue that fluctuation should be least likely
to occur when the decision implicates a strong value position like the juror's
view of the death penalty.
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the opening arguments, that percentage fluctuated
throughout the trial, rising to a high of 54% after the prose-
cution expert's direct examination, falling to 43% after the
defendant's direct examination, and ending after the judge's
instructions at 48%.84 Thus, although opening statements
may play a crucial role in channeling and molding juror
verdicts, the claim that "the lawyer who hasn't hooked them
by [the end of opening statement] might as well forget
about winning"8 5 is clearly overstated.
6. Reactions to Experts
Trials increasingly involve the testimony of experts who
present technical and scientific evidence. Such complex evi-
dence presents a challenge for the experts who must com-
municate with a lay audience, for the judge who acts either
as a gatekeeper in ruling on which experts can testify and
what they can say or as the trier of fact, and for the lay
jury. How do juries handle expert testimony? Are jurors
generally confused or misled by experts? Are they likely to
be overwhelmed and uncritical, impressed by jargon they do
not understand and overawed by experts with impressive
credentials? Do they simply ignore expert testimony, turn-
ing to less complex evidence as a basis for their decisions?
Surveys of jurors indicate that they find expert testimony to
be useful, but they are wary of experts. For example, in a
survey of jurors, 30% said that "experts provided biased tes-
timony."8 6 Similarly, Diamond and Casper found that jurors
view experts as relatively competent and likely to be knowl-
edgeable, but they also expect experts to be influenced by
the side that called them.8 7 Credibility of a communicator is
influenced by the communicator's expertise and trustwor-
84. Id. 'At the end of opening statements, 39% favored death; after the
prosecution's witnesses testified, 51% favored death; at the end of the defense
testimony, 47% favored death." Id. at 31 n.57.
85. GUINTHER, supra note 65, at 60.
86. Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Court-Part II: A
Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 173, 203 (1994).
87. See Diamond & Casper, supra note 45.
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thiness, so that the expectation of potential bias acts as a
brake on the persuasiveness of an expert.88
Jurors typically work hard at trying to understand the
content of expert testimony. Motivation, however, is not
enough to ensure success and jurors often express concern
about their ability to handle complex evidence.8 9 Although
jurors are sometimes confused by expert testimony,90 they
generally are not beguiled and misled by the complexity of
expert evidence. Moreover, the jury uses reasonable strate-
gies to evaluate expert testimony9' and draws on the exper-
tise of their most competent member to assess the strength
of the evidence. 92
Jurors are instructed to base their verdicts on the evi-
dence and legal instructions, but their ability to fully proc-
ess the evidence may be reduced if the expert fails to teach
as well as to attempt to persuade. When faced with techni-
cal testimony, jurors look for cues about the trustworthi-
ness of the source, sometimes using the language itself as a
cue. When a decision-maker accepts a persuasive message
in response merely to cues like the prestigious credentials
or complicated language of the source of the message, how-
ever, and has not processed and evaluated the message it-
self, the decision-maker is engaging in peripheral (or heu-
ristic) processing in contrast to the central (or systematic)
processing of the expert testimony that would be entailed in
88. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 513, 558 (1992).
89. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995).
Judges have expressed similar concerns about their own competence. See Sam-
uel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1114, 1180.
90. MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY Picus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE
(1987). See generally Joseph Sanders Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case:
Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45 (1993).
91. See Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert
E. Litan ed., 1993); Irwin Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental In-
vestigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
379 (1990); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evi-
dence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1143 (200 1).
92. See Diamond & Casper, supra note 45.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a thorough evaluation of the evidence. 93 There is little evi-
dence to suggest that jurors adopt the position of an expert
based solely on peripheral cues. What is more likely to hap-
pen is that the juror will reject unintelligible expert testi-
mony, a pattern that should create an incentive for experts
(and for the attorneys who hire them) to maximize the clar-
ity of the expert's presentation.
When jurors do understand the expert's testimony, im-
pressive credentials and technical language can boost the
influence of an expert.94 When the expert's lack of clarity
prevents jurors from understanding the testimony, jurors
who do not understand it are less likely to be influenced by
it. 9 5 This pattern is consistent with the literature on per-
suasion, which indicates that use of obscure and unusual
words reduces persuasiveness, 96 and with models of attitude
change that emphasize reception as a precondition to yield-
ing. 97 Moreover, jargon may also lead jurors to give less cre-
dence to an expert who displays other evidence of potential
bias, such as an unusually high rate of pay.98
Expert testimony represents a challenge for both judges
and jurors. Although judges are legal experts, at least as
compared to most juries, neither judge nor jury is likely to
be an expert on the technical substantive content that an
expert may offer. Moreover, a jury of twelve (or even six) is
more likely to have at least one member who has a relevant
93. See Timothy C. Brock, Historical and Methodological Perspectives in the
Analysis of Cognitive Responses: An Introduction, in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN
PERSUASION 3 (Richard E. Petty et al. eds., 1981); Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic
Model of Persuasion, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 3 (Mark
P. Zanna et al. eds., 1987); ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF ATTITUDES 326-27 (1993).
94. See Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A. Bennett, & Holly L. Sukel, Complex Scien-
tific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 379,
379 (1996).
95. See Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 542-43.
96. See generally John Waite Bowers, Language Intensity, Social Introver-
sion, and Attitude Change, 30 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 345 (1963).
97. See William J. McGuire, Attitude Change: The Information-processing
Paradigm, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 108 (Charles Graham
McClintock ed., 1972).
98. See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The "Hired Gun" Effect: Assessing
the Effect of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of
Expert Testimony, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 149 (2000).
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substantive background in, for example, engineering. In
general, there is no evidence that complexity induces a
greater rate of disagreement between judges and juries on
the appropriate verdict.99 Thus, while complexity presents a
challenge to legal decision-making in general, the challenge
may be unavoidable and not unique to juries.
7. The Judge's Instructions on the Law
In theory, jurors are expected to apply the law as the
judge describes it to the facts as the jury finds them. A ver-
dict itself rarely reveals whether the jury has applied the
judge's instructions on the law, or wh.ther the jury has ap-
plied them accurately. 100 Thus, trial and appellate courts
are left to assume that the jury has followed the judge's in-
structions when the verdict is consistent with the law under
at least one possible interpretation of the facts. Questions
about the jury's use of the legal instructions typically arise
at the appellate level only in the context of questions about
whether the trial court has stated the legal standard accu-
rately. If the statement of the law comports with the legal
standard, questions are rarely raised about whether it fails
to communicate the standard clearly and to convey effec-
tively how the legal standard should be applied. Research-
ers, in contrast, have not relied merely on verdicts and an
examination of legal instructions to assess how jurors han-
dle instructions on the law.
Jurors may fail to follow the judge's instructions on the
law if they are either unmotivated or unable to apply the
instructions. Empirical studies of the jury give no indication
that juries simply neglect the instructions. Simulations,
post-trial interviews with real jurors, and the analysis of
jury behavior during deliberations in real trials show that
jurors see themselves as obligated to apply the law, and
that they spend a significant portion of their time during
deliberations discussing the law.
99. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 26,
at 49.
100. A rare exception occurs when the jury in a civil case is given a set of
interrogatories that the jury answers inconsistently. When that outcome occurs,




Yet there is also evidence that legal instructions as they
are typically given often fail to provide jurors with helpful
legal guidance. 10 1 Over twenty years ago, Elwork and his
colleagues examined juror comprehension of several fre-
quently used jury instructions. 102 They showed not only that
comprehension was low, but also that it could be signifi-
cantly improved when the instructions were rewritten using
a combination of psycholinguistic tools and common
sense. 103 More recent work has demonstrated additional
ways to facilitate comprehension. The traditional approach
to jury instructions is to tell the jury only what it is sup-
posed to do, and to avoid directing attention to any concern
that the jury should ignore. But failing to address the erro-
neous beliefs that jurors do have does not make those be-
liefs go away and it does not neutralize them. For example,
if jurors are worried about whether a defendant not sen-
tenced to death will be eligible for parole, avoiding any
mention during jury instructions can leave jurors believing
that a swift release is likely. 104 Jurors come to court with
expectations, beliefs, and schemas that can powerfully af-
fect perceptions, attention, and recall. 105 When instructions
fail to correct inaccurate legal impressions, they miss the
opportunity to provide jurors with a meaningful legal
framework.
Although the most common source of deviations from
legal standards is a failure of the legal instructions to con-
vey clearly what the appropriate legal standard is, jurors
also may deviate from the path outlined in the instructions
due to cognitive biases or motivational obstacles. Jurors
admonished to disregard particular information may find it
difficult to do so. In Diamond and Casper's antitrust re-
101. See Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches
Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAw 589, 589
(1997).
102. See AMIRAM ELWORK, BRUCE D. SALES & JAMES J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY
INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).
103. See id. at 145-81.
104. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Ju-
ries, and Judges, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423, 429 (1993); Diamond & Casper, su-
pra note 45 (22% predicted release in less than ten years; a total of 56% pre-
dicted release in less than twenty years).
105. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (Phillip G.
Zimbardo ed., McGraw-Hill 1991) (1984).
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search, jurors learned that their award in a price-fixing
case would be automatically trebled by the judge. 106 In one
version of the instructions, they were told nothing further
and they reduced their damage awards to avoid a plaintiff
windfall. 107 In a second version, they were simply admon-
ished not to alter their award because it would be trebled.
The result was that the admonition failed to stop the jurors
from reducing their awards.10 8 In contrast, when a third
group of jurors was provided with the admonition accompa-
nied by a rationale-that the trebling provision was de-
signed by Congress to punish and deter-the jurors fol-
lowed the instruction and did not reduce their damage
awards.
Other legal instructions may ask the jurors to engage in
mental gymnastics that are not easy to perform-e.g., to
use a defendant's criminal record only to assist in evaluat-
ing his credibility, but not as evidence of bad character; to
forget that they learned about damaging evidence that the
judge ruled inadmissible-and jurors may be unwilling or
find it impossible to perform the required cognitive adjust-
ments. A series of simulation experiments have illustrated
how such inadmissible evidence can affect juror deci-
sions.1 09 The remaining question is whether these failures
are significantly less likely when the trier of fact is a judge,
or whether they represent heuristic patterns of using in-
formation that neither can overcome. 110
Finally, jurors may depart from the judge's legal in-
structions when the application of the legal standard to the
particular case so substantially violates the jurors' sense of
justice that they are persuaded to temper the letter of the
law in that case. Kalven and Zeisel attributed most of the
106. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 521-26.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Michael T. Nietzel, Denis M. McCarthy & Monica J. Kern, Juries:
The Current State of the Empirical Literature, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE
STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23, 33-35 (Ronald Roesch, Stephen D. Hart & James R.
P. Ogloff eds., 1999).
110. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
garding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2005); Stephan Landsman & Richard F.
Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information
on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 113 (1994).
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disagreements they found between judge and jury to evi-
dentiary disputes, reporting that the jury is engaged in only
a modest rewriting of the law in cases that are close on the
evidence."' Yet even if it is rare, explicit jury nullification
of the application of the law plays a central role in concep-
tions of the jury and has been a source of extensive debate.
Although courts have long recognized the power (as opposed
to the right) of the jury to nullify, courts and commentators
have argued about whether juries should be told about that
power. 112 Empirical research indicates that the distinction
between the power and the right matters: when jurors are
explicitly instructed that they have the right not to apply
the law as the judge describes it, they are more willing to
reach verdicts that temper the literal application of the
law.113
Jury instructions rarely receive the attention from the
parties and their lawyers that is consistent with the atten-
tion that the instructions receive from the jury. Juries may
not always follow the instructions but a primary cause of
that failure is the inadequacy of the instructions rather
than a willful disregard by the jury.
8. Foreperson Selection and Influence
The only instruction that jurors typically receive about
how to conduct their deliberations is to select a foreper-
son. 114 Although the foreperson's role is not clearly defined,
the license to organize the group may confer an enhanced
opportunity to influence outcomes. Thus, the choice of fore-
person is potentially a critical event in deliberations.
111. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 106-07, 119.
112. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1997);
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally
Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power: The
Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 165 (1991).
113. See Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on
Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 25
(1985).
114. The American Judicature Society responded to this vacuum by produc-
ing a short manual that provides jurors with some suggestions on how to handle
deliberations. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: A RESOURCE
MANUAL TO IMPROVE JURY DELIBERATIONS (1999).
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If the foreperson is particularly influential, we would
expect to find a higher correlation between the foreperson's
predeliberation verdict preference and the jury verdict than
between the verdict preference of non-forepersons and the
jury verdict. Unlike an observational study of real juries in
which no predeliberation verdicts are available, or a post-
trial interview study in which jurors must reconstruct their
predeliberation verdict preferences, simulations provide an
opportunity to test that hypothesis directly by comparing
independent and contemporaneous predeliberation verdict
preferences and jury verdicts. Diamond and Casper found a
correlation of .44 between forepersons' predeliberation
award preferences and their jury's award and a signifi-
cantly lower correlation of .22 between non-forepersons'
predeliberation award preferences and their jury's
award. 115 The apparent enhanced influence of the foreper-
son did not arise because the foreperson's original position
reflected a particularly accurate representation of the ju-
ror's predeliberation verdict preferences. Forepersons' pre-
deliberation awards were on average 25% higher than the
median predeliberation awards of the juries. 116
The selection of the foreperson proceeds swiftly. For ex-
ample, Diamond and Casper found that selection was gen-
erally completed within the first few minutes on two differ-
ent types of simulated juries-in both an antitrust case
involving six person juries and a death penalty case involv-
ing twelve person juries. 117 Similar speed marked selection
on real juries in the Arizona Filming Project (a median time
to selection of 1.5 minutes, with 80% selected within the
first five minutes).118 Although swift, selection is not ran-
dom. In addition to visual cues about age, gender, socio-
economic class, and race, by the time deliberations begin,
jurors have listened to each other's conversation-during
voir dire and in conversations during breaks. In an early
study of decision-making by simulated juries, Strodtbeck
115. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 547.
116. Id. at 549.
117. Diamond & Casper, supra note 45.
118. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Andrea Krebel & Beth Mur-
phy, Presiding Jurors: Selection and Performance (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Buffalo Law Review) (paper presented on July 8, 2006 at the Law
and Society Association Annual Meeting, Baltimore).
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and his colleagues found that males, higher status jurors,
jurors with prior jury service, and those sitting at the end of
the table were over-represented as forepersons. 119 When
their data were collected in the 1950s, gender was strongly
correlated with status and it is not clear whether gender
and status independently contributed to predicting foreper-
son selection. Moreover, jurors in this simulation, as in
most others, did not go through voir dire or sit through trial
breaks where they had an opportunity to learn more about
one another before deliberations began than what could be
gleaned from visual cues.
Forty-five years later, on the real civil juries in the Ari-
zona Filming Project, males and jurors with professional or
managerial occupations were more likely to become foreper-
sons, and the effect of gender persisted even after control-
ling for occupation. Diamond and Casper, however, found
some additional features in the pattern of foreperson selec-
tion in their elaborate simulation study conducted in a
courthouse using members of the jury pool. 120 The jurors
were sent to lunch together before their deliberations began
in order to give them a chance to get acquainted, as they
would in a real trial, before deliberations began. As in a real
trial in most jurisdictions, they were instructed not to dis-
cuss the case during lunch. As in earlier research, foreper-
sons were significantly more likely to be jurors who spoke
first or were seated at the head of the table. Although jurors
have some control over both of these characteristics, neither
was significantly correlated with the other characteristics
that predicted the choice of foreperson. While prior jury
service was among the variety of criteria that were men-
tioned in the course of choosing a foreperson, prior service
did not predict the choice of foreperson. 121 Other significant
119. Fred L. Strodtbeck, Rita M. James & Charles Hawkins, Social Status
in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 713, 715 (1957).
120. Diamond & Casper, supra note 45.
121. Strodtbeck and Lipinski, as well as Kerr, found that jurors with prior
jury service were more likely than first time jurors to become forepersons, while
Ellsworth did not find that prior jury experience increased the probability of be-
coming foreperson. Compare Fred L. Strodtbeck & Richard M. Lipinski, Becom-
ing First Among Equals: Moral Considerations in Jury Foreman Selection, 49 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 927 (1985), and Norbert L. Kerr, Douglas L.
Harmon & James K. Graves, Independence of Multiple Verdicts by Jurors and
Juries, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, 24 (1982) with Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are
Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 213 (1989).
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predictors varied with the type of case. Occupational status
predicted foreperson selection in the antitrust case, but
gender was not related to choice of foreperson. In the death
penalty case, gender predicted foreperson selection, but oc-
cupational status had no predictive value. Additional pre-
dictors reveal a nuanced pattern of foreperson selection. In
the antitrust case, one of the central witnesses was a statis-
tician who used a regression model to arrive at an estimate
of what the price of the defendants' product would have
been in the absence of the price-fixing agreement. Higher
education and whether a juror had taken a statistics course
made independent contributions in predicting foreperson
selection on the antitrust juries. This choice offered some
potential benefits: jurors with higher educational levels and
those who had taken a statistics course demonstrated a bet-
ter understanding of the statistical expert's testimony on
individual comprehension tests.
Does this pattern of selection merely reflect a tendency
to select higher status jurors as forepersons? The contrast
with the choice pattern in the death penalty case suggests
that it does not. While on both the antitrust and death pen-
alty cases, jurors with higher levels of education were more
likely to be selected as forepersons, education was a
stronger predictor of foreperson identity on the antitrust
case, which included complex quantitative testimony, than
on the death penalty case. 122 Moreover, after position at the
table, a juror's report that he or she had taken a course in
statistics was the strongest predictor of who the foreperson
would be on the antitrust juries, while on the death penalty
case, once education was accounted for, a statistics course
did not increase the likelihood that a juror would be se-
lected as foreperson. 123
In the jurisdictions in the Strodtbeck and Kerr studies, jury service lasted sev-
eral weeks, providing multiple opportunities for recent prior service. As a re-
sult, jury experience was common (34% and 42% had served previously) and sa-
lient. See Strodtbeck, supra at 930. In contrast, Diamond and Casper's research
was conducted in a jurisdiction using a one day/one trial system, so that any
prior jury experience would necessarily have been at least a year earlier.
122. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 552-53; Diamond & Casper, su-
pra note 45.
123. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 553; Diamond & Casper, supra
note 45.
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The final step in evaluating the foreperson's role is to
test whether the foreperson's apparent enhanced influence
is affected by the personal attributes associated with the se-
lection of the foreperson. On their antitrust juries, Diamond
and Casper compared the correlations between individual
predeliberation award preferences and jury awards for
forepersons and nonforepersons who had or lacked charac-
teristics associated with the choice of a foreperson. 124 These
comparisons revealed that neither sitting at the head of the
table nor speaking first modified the enhanced influence of
the foreperson. 125 Nor did these behaviors affect the influ-
ence of nonforepersons. Similarly, forepersons who had pro-
fessional or managerial occupations were no more influen-
tial than those who did not. In contrast, a prior statistics
course significantly increased the influence of forepersons,
producing a correlation of .63 between the individual ver-
dicts of forepersons with a statistics course and the verdicts
of their juries. 126 When the foreperson had no course in sta-
tistics, the foreperson was no more influential than any
other juror. Task-relevant expertise thus increased the like-
lihood that a person would be selected as foreperson, and
when such a person was chosen, the foreperson appeared to
exert an unusually strong impact on the jury's outcome.
Consistent with the view that forepersons not randomly
chosen for the position 127 generally tend to exert a dispro-
portionate influence on jury verdicts, jurors on both the an-
titrust and death penalty juries rated the forepersons as
significantly more influential than the average nonforeper-
son. 128 How that influence comes about, however, is crucial.
According to the death penalty jurors, who were asked to
rate the open-mindedness of each juror as well as their in-
fluence, forepersons were also viewed as significantly more
open-minded than the average juror. The picture that
124. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 552 tbl.7.
125. Id.
126. Id,
127. In Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington's jury simulation, the experimenter
randomly appointed one of the jurors as the foreperson if no member of the jury
had previously served as a jury foreperson. Although the foreperson on average
spoke more than other jurors, the appointed foreperson had no enhanced influ-
ence on the jury's verdict. See generally HASTIE ET AL., supra note 50.
128. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 548.
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emerges is that juries that select their presiding juror do
not randomly pick a leader they follow blindly, but rather
that they are inclined to select leaders who help them ei-
ther substantively or procedurally or both.
9. The Most Talkative Juror
Both simulations and our current observations of real
juries provide an opportunity to examine the process of de-
liberation, making it possible to identify and measure the
contributions of each juror. Like people outside the jury
room, jurors vary in how much they talk, but there is little
support for the image of the long-winded juror who occupies
center stage in deliberations, dominating discussion while
inhibiting the flow of productive exchange among jurors.
Diamond and Casper found that the most active juror apart,
from the foreperson spoke on average three times as much
as the average juror on the twelve-member juries in a death
penalty case. 129 In an antitrust case, among six jurors, the
most active juror apart from the foreperson spoke on aver-
age twice as much as the average juror. These jurors also
tended to contribute more information to the deliberations,
in each case responsible on average for bringing up three
times the number of basic facts than the average juror men-
tioned during deliberations. On average they were per-
ceived as more influential than less talkative jurors, and in
the antitrust case their predeliberation verdict was a
stronger predictor of the jury's verdict than was the average
juror's initial position. On the death penalty case, however,
the most talkative juror was no more or less likely to
change their position than the average juror. Moreover, the
most talkative jurors were four times as likely as the aver-
age juror to be perceived as the most open-minded member
of the jury, and no more likely to be perceived as least open-
minded.
None of this suggests that attempts to dominate the
jury do not occur. We have seen instances in both simula-
tions and on the real juries in the Arizona Filming Project,
in which a talkative juror persistently attempts to seize the
floor during discussion. The outcomes we have seen from
these attempts, however, are not captured juries, but rather
129. Diamond & Casper, supra note 45.
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temporary toleration and ultimate loss of attention from the
other members of the group. Talkative jurors who are influ-
ential are likely to be jurors who show higher rates of com-
prehension for both evidence and instructions, are per-
ceived as more open-minded, and contribute productively to
the group's deliberative process.
10. Do Deliberations Matter?
Deliberations resulting in a group verdict distinguish
the jury from its chief alternative, the trial court judge. By
requiring agreement from multiple jurors, the jury verdict
in principle reduces the likelihood that the decision will
represent an idiosyncratic view of a single deviant decision-
maker. Moreover, in theory, deliberations give the jury an
opportunity to profit from the resources of its multiple
members and to pool its knowledge and sensibilities and to
resolve differences, ultimately producing a verdict that re-
flects more than what could be achieved either by a single
decisionmaker or by mechanically combining or averaging
the preferences of the individual members.
The extent to which deliberations actually do affect jury
verdicts, however, is in dispute. Some scholars have sug-
gested that jury verdicts are predetermined by the initial
predeliberation vote distribution, 130 so that deliberations
play only a mechanical role in transforming predeliberation
preferences to verdicts. Both simulation studies and post-
verdict interviews provide evidence for the importance of
the predeliberation vote distribution as a predictor of jury
verdicts, but the evidence also indicates that deliberations
can play an important role in decision making on the jury.
Post-verdict reports of jurors about the distribution on the
first vote were the basis for Kalven and Zeisel's claims
about deliberation. 131 Yet more recent research suggests a
significant weakness in using that source to estimate the
transition between predeliberation voting and verdict: ju-
rors do not generally take a closed ballot vote at the begin-
130. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 489 (comparing deliberations to
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ning of their deliberations, the only procedure that would
reveal independent vote preferences. 132
If discussion precedes a vote, and it usually does, that
vote will reflect any changes that have occurred as a result
of the discussion. The deliberation process revealed in jury
simulations indicates that the majority of juries do not use
a verdict-driven deliberation style in which jurors take an
immediate vote without discussing the evidence. 133 In the
Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington study, 28% of the juries
took an immediate vote; 134 in the Diamond and Casper re-
search, 21% of the antitrust juries did, and 21% of the death
penalty juries did. 135 Sandys and Dillehay report an even
lower rate (3%) of immediate voting on real juries, at least
according to post-trial juror interviews. 136 Moreover, juries
tend to delay voting precisely when deliberations are likely
to be most influential. In the Arizona Filming Project, the
longer the trial, the longer jurors discussed the evidence be-
fore taking an initial vote (r = .54).137
A comparison of the predeliberation vote distributions
and verdicts obtained from jury simulations reveals a num-
ber of systematic shifts that result from deliberations. The
trial that Hastie and his colleagues studied presented ju-
rors with four verdict possibilities. 138 The modal verdict
132. If jurors do take a preliminary vote by, for example, going around the
table, the expressed verdict preferences of those voting first can influence the
votes of those who express their verdict preferences later. See James H. Davis,
Mark Stasson, Kaoru Ono & Suzi Zimmerman, Effects of Straw Polls on Group
Decision Making: Sequential Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918, 923 (1988).
133. Verdict-driven juries, in contrast to evidence-driven juries, also tend to
engage in less vigorous discussions. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 50, at 165.
134. Id. at 164 ((19/69) = 28%).
135. An immediate vote was defined as a vote within ten minutes for the
twelve member Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington juries and the Diamond and
Casper death penalty juries. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 50, at 164; Diamond &
Casper, supra note 45. It was defined as a vote within five minutes for the six
member antitrust juries. Diamond & Casper, supra note 45. Diamond and Cas-
per found that a juror frequently called for a vote very early in the delibera-
tions, but that voting, even if agreed to by some of the other jurors, was ordinar-
ily derailed by discussion. Id.
136. Sandys & Dillehay, supra note 17, at 186.
137. Diamond et al., Juror Discussions, supra note 10, at 62.
138. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 50, at 21 fig.2.3.
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preference of the juries was not the most frequent individ-
ual predeliberation verdict preference, although it was the
verdict preferred by a set of legal experts. The median pre-
deliberation damage award in Diamond and Casper's anti-
trust case was the best predictor of the jury's award, but it
was accompanied by a systematic increase in the damage
level (on average, an increase of 27%). 139 As jurors dis-
cussed the evidence about damages caused by the price-
fixing agreement, they tended to see the behavior as more
damaging. Finally, a series of studies in criminal cases sug-
gest that a leniency bias stemming from the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard emerges during deliberations, so
that when the jury is close to evenly divided, jurors favoring
an acquittal are more likely to influence the jury's ver-
dict.140
In the film Twelve Angry Men, 141 the jury began delib-
erations with a single juror favoring an acquittal and ended
with a not guilty verdict. Although it might be believable
that juror Henry Fonda could exercise such persuasive
powers, most juries probably do end up with a verdict that
reflects the majority that is visible by the time most of the
jurors have expressed a verdict preference in deliberations.
The majority, using both normative and informational pres-
sure, persuades the minority to accept its position. 142 The
situation is more complicated when there are multiple ver-
139. Diamond & Casper, supra note 88, at 546, 553. Increased compensatory
damage awards following deliberations were also found by others.
See, e.g., David T. Wasserman & J. Neil Robinson, Extra-legal Influences, Group
Processes, and Jury Decision-making: A Psychological Perspective, 12 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 96, 147 (1980); James Zuehl, The Ad Damnum, Jury Instructions,
and Personal Injury Damage Awards (1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Buffalo Law Review). In addition, Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E.
Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative Versus Informational Influence:
Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
306, 309 (1987), found an inflation effect of deliberation on punitive, but not
compensatory awards. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel Kahneman,
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000)
also found an increase in punitive awards following deliberations.
140. Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert Kerr, Asymmetric Influences in Mock
Jury Deliberation: Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 21, 26 (1988).
141. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (Orien-Nova Productions 1957).
142. See generally Morton Deutch & Harold B. Gerard, A Study of Norma-
tive and Informational Social Influences upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. OF
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1955).
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dict choices.1 43 We are at the early stages of understanding
how juries resolve their differences when faced with a large
variety of potential outcomes, but it is clear that, contrary
to some earlier claims, deliberations can play an important
role.
IV. WHAT WE STILL DON'T KNOW
Despite the yield from empirical research conducted on
juries, there are significant gaps in our knowledge about
jury behavior, in part because there are so many questions
to ask about it, in part because most of the time we can
study it only indirectly, and in part because data have not
been collected to address many questions. For example, we
only recently conducted any systematic research on hung
juries despite repeated claims suggesting that hung juries
are common, that they result from a single recalcitrant ju-
ror who refuses to accept what the evidence clearly shows,
and that the rate of hung juries demonstrates a failure of
the legal system. The researchers at the National Center
for State Courts (NCSC) set about to learn some basics
about hung jury rates and discovered that no national data
were available in state courts because most court systems
view hung juries as merely interim case outcomes. 144 More-
over, when the NCSC researchers attempted to collect the
information from each state court, they learned that even in
states that did record hung jury rates, there was ambiguity
on precisely what was being counted. Should a jury be con-
sidered "hung" if it reached a verdict on the most serious
charge and could not agree on one of the lesser counts?
Thus, Hannnaford and her colleagues were appropriately
modest in their claims about the accuracy of their estimate
of a rate of 6.2% based on the hung jury rates they were
able to get for criminal trials in thirty urban jurisdic-
tions.145
143. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 50, at 160-61 (reporting on a study in
which juries chose among three levels of homicide plus self-defense). See gener-
ally Diamond & Casper, supra note 88 (reporting on a study in which juries de-
cided damages in a civil case).
144. Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, How
Much Justice Hangs in the Balance? A New Look at Hung Jury Rates, 83
JUDICATURE 59, 60 (1999).
145. Id.
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Further information about the hung juries presented an
even bigger problem. If no court was regularly keeping a re-
cord of what the final vote distribution was when a jury
failed to reach a verdict, there was no way to learn how of-
ten a single holdout produced the hung jury. A simulation
approach to the study of hung juries has some inherent
weaknesses. Simulations, unlike real trials, must generally
limit the time provided for deliberations, so that the num-
ber of hung juries is likely to be inflated and their charac-
teristics are unlikely to accurately represent those of hung
juries in real cases.
This story has a successful conclusion. Hannaford and
her colleagues were eventually able to collect data on ap-
proximately 382 criminal cases in four jurisdictions, yield-
ing twenty seven cases that hung on all counts, and another
ninety seven that hung on at least one count. 146 They found
that hung jury rates varied substantially across jurisdic-
tions, and according to the measure used. Through their
post-trial juror and judge surveys, they found, among other
things, that a majority of hung juries had more than two ju-
rors in the minority on the final vote, and that both the ju-
rors and the judges rated the evidence in cases that re-
sulted in hung juries as more evenly balanced as opposed to
favoring one side or the other.147
Other questions remain unaddressed. Some examples:
what is the effect of sequestration on jury deliberations?
How does giving jury instructions before rather than after
closing arguments affect jury deliberations? Unanswered
questions about the jury may generate research opportuni-
ties for those of us who are fascinated by this ancient insti-
tution and interested generally in questions about judg-
ment and social influence, but the gaps also create obstacles
for policymakers who are willing to turn to scientific re-
search to ground, at least in part, their policy decisions. In
the wake of the trials involving O.J. Simpson, the Rodney
King beatings, the McDonald's coffee case, and the Vioxx
verdicts, jury reform is on the public agenda and the pro-
posals are frequently grounded in little more than anecdo-
146. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P. HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT & G.
THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?
(2002).
147. Id. at 67.
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tal speculation about the jury. Research on the jury offers
one way to respond to the uninformed reform frenzy. A pro-
gressive judiciary and an imaginative research community
can form productive partnerships in generating knowledge.
Thus, Heuer and Penrod, with the cooperation of the Wis-
consin judiciary, were able to institute an experiment in
permitting jurors to submit questions for witnesses during
trial. 148 The experimental reform reduced attorney reluc-
tance and delighted jurors. The Arizona Filming Project
provided researchers a chance to work with the court to ex-
amine how jurors handle an invitation to discuss the case
amongst themselves during breaks in the course of the
trial. 149 In both the Wisconsin and Arizona cases, the re-
search was designed to evaluate an innovation, but also
provided an opportunity to examine other aspects of jury
behavior, advancing both basic research and policy agen-
das.150
Researchers have accumulated a large body of empirical
work on the jury. Although the available theory and data
are often incomplete, they offer a substantial corrective to
both the fantasy and nightmare versions of the jury that
emerge from the anecdotal and unrepresentative accounts
that the public and policy-makers generally receive.
148. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 26, at 34.
149. Diamond et al., Juror Discussions, supra note 10, at 4.
150. See generally Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 10; Diamond et al., Juror
Questions During Trial, supra note 10.

